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Conceptuality in Relation: Sarah Franklin in conversation with Silvia Posocco, Paul Boyce, and 
EJ Gonzalez-Polledo 
 
Editors’ Note: In preparation for the interview, we worked together to develop a set of 
questions which we shared with Sarah Franklin in advance of our meeting. We met 
Sarah Franklin in Cambridge in March 2018. 
EJ:  Would you like to contextualise for us when your relation with Marilyn Strathern’s 
work began? 
Sarah Franklin:    
I took a somewhat unusual path through academia because I did an undergraduate 
degree in women’s studies a long time ago I graduated in 1982, and there weren’t 
really any graduate programmes in feminism, gender or women’s studies in the 
early 1980s in the United States. There were things like gender and history, women 
and history, women in philosophy things like that.  So I took a year off. I was working 
in Paris for a year and I noticed that the British Universities have a much later 
application deadlines and they were much cheaper because they just had home fees 
for everyone and there was a women’s studies postgraduate programme at the 
University of Kent. I went to Kent in the autumn of 1983 and started the women’s 
studies programme there with Mary Evans and that was a sensational programme. 
By that point I had pretty much decided that I would really like to do a PhD, and I 
wasn’t going to be able to do one in women’s studies, so one of my former tutors 
suggested that I apply to the new NYU programme in social anthropology that was 
being headed up by Annette Weiner. I applied was accepted, I got a scholarship I 
moved to New York in the autumn of 1984s. Annette Weiner was one of the first 
feminist anthropologists to work on reproduction, so she invited her colleague, 
Carol Delaney, to come give a presentation at NYU in the spring of 1985 which was 
based on her paper ‘The Meaning  of Paternity in the Virgin Birth Debate’, which 
showed how ideas about conception aren’t straightforward in any sense of the 
term; that was when I started to get very interested in  the possibility of doing an 
anthropological project on changing ideas of conception in western societies. 
Instead of going to New Guinea or Australia, I wanted to do a “talk-back” to the 
virgin birth debate based on a very detailed ethnographic study of in vitro 
fertilization. I proposed that to my PhD committee and for various reasons they 
basically said that wasn’t going to be acceptable.  
So I converted my early PhD into an MA and as my dissertation I wrote ‘Conception 
among the Anthropologists’ juxtaposing IVF and virgin birth debates.  
And then I moved to the UK in 1986 and I got a place at the Birmingham Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies, and  
Istarted doing the Phd, and my supervisor Maureen McNeil,  was a historian of 
science who did her degree  at the University of Cambridge. She worked on ideas of 
progress in the work of Erasmus Darwin, Charles Darwin’s grandfather. So that kind 
of fitted, interestingly with exploring ideas about biology and reproduction and 
scientific objectivity and all that. Maureen and I started a Science and Technology 
Sub-Group and we were doing a lot of work on reproductive politics in the UK; that 
was a time when they were trying to repeal the abortion act and human fertilization 
and embryology bill  was going through Parliament. It was also the time when Clause 
28 was enacted, so it was a very interesting period mid-way or towards the end of 
Thatcher’s career. And we wrote a lot about Thatcherism and reproductive politics  
in  Off Centre: Feminism and Cultural Studies  (1991).  I was also working on my PhD 
at this time, and I interviewed around 30 women in Birmingham about their 
experiences of IVF and that was the basis for my later book Embodied Progress 
(1997).  
In 1989 when I was finishing my Phd I saw a job advertised in the Manchester 
Anthropology department and I applied for it. It was for a Lectureship in Gender and 
Kinship. I wasn’t finished with my PhD, so obviously it was a bit of a long shot, but 
Marilyn wrote me a note and she said ‘I read your very interesting application and I 
read that you wrote your MA on the question of the virgin birth debate and 
reproductive technology so could you send me a copy?’ So I sent that to Marilyn and 
she read it and then invited me to come to Manchester. So that was the first time I 
met Marilyn, in June of 1989, and we talked for about three and a half hours.  As if 
that wasn’t amazing enough she then handed me the manuscript of After Nature 
and asked me if I would be willing to read it and give her f=some feedback!! So I 
took it back to Birmingham and I remember walking back to my house from the bus 
stop  with this manuscript in my bag and thinking ‘Wow! I can’t believe that just 
actually happened!’ Because she totally got the whole entire idea of the disturbance 
to ‘the biological facts’ caused by IVF and all that. She was the first person I ever met 
who got it. You know like why you would want to do a project that was 
deconstructing biology via reproductive technology in relation to these debates 
about conception in Anthropology.  It made total sense to her. So we started 
working together.  
My first job was working as a researcher on what became the ESRC project 
Technologies of Procreation (1993). It was a joint project with me, Marilyn, Eric 
Hirsch, Frances Paton and Jeanette Edwards.  That research went from 1990 to 91, it 
was just one  year.. And that’s when I decided that I wanted to work on the human 
embryo, I wanted to work on how the technologisation of reproduction actually 
queers our understandings of biology. And I think that’s basically what I’ve been 
working on ever since. Except I don’t think its often legible as that. I think if you’re 
working on fertility it’s such an incredibly heternormative area, it’s not really clear 
why that would be a queer topic. But of course it is.  
Paul:   There’s a convergence between the re-thinking of the anthropological tradition and 
the re-thinking of reproductive technologies. Can you say a little more about how 
that convergence came about in your experience?  
Sarah:  You use the same word for knowledge and for procreation you know, to conceive an 
idea. I think if you take seriously you have to understand that of course it will affect 
knowledge practices. But I think where you go with that is really a slightly different 
question. If you want to go back into the disciplines you have in front of you a rich 
reproductive world, because that’s what the disciplines are doing. They’re 
reproducing themselves. So as soon as you start to look at disciplinarity of any kind 
you’re looking at lineages of inherited ideas, you’re looking at the protection of that 
legacy, you’re looking at the insides and the outsides of the disciplines, you’re 
looking at the gatekeeping practices, you’re looking at the generally quite patrilineal 
structure of a descent system that is profoundly anthropological. So if you are an 
anthropologist and you’re doing that, then you have a lot of grist for your mill as it 
were. And you are going to see disciplines in terms not only of reproductive politics, 
but of reproductive conflicts. So, yeah, I think that’s one of the things that Marilyn 
has done – to link together gender, knowledge, reproduction, identity and power 
differently. But Marilyn, as she notes in Before and After Gender, also has a very 
generous idea about conflict. She thinks that conflict is essential to the social life of 
say, a discipline or scholarly community. So she’s not looking to end conflict as it 
were, but she is looking to understand gender much more in those terms, as 
something that’s fundamentally a part of any social world. And indeed almost 
synonymous with how the social world is built.  
EJ:  It’s interesting that the work before Women In Between was actually about conflict, 
about disputes… 
Sarah:  Yeah, her early work was about disputes as well. The settling of disputes in courts.  
EJ: I wonder if you could frame for us what or how you see the object of queer anthropology 
developing in those intervening years between the period you’ve talked about and 
Before and After Gender… 
Sarah:  You mean from the 80s and 90s onwards 
EJ: Right. How do you see that development?  
Sarah: I think it was very important from the end of the 1980s and in 1990. Judith Butler 
published Gender Trouble and when I read it I definitely thought that is clearly the 
most articulate version of trying to say that gender comes before sex which is an 
even more radical claim than most people think and very parallel to what I was 
trying to do in my own work at the time.  I don’t know how useful it is to do a sort of 
genealogy of queer because that’s a kind of oxymoron, but I definitely think the 
impulse to undo the apparent fixity of the biological is a very, very strong theme in a 
lot of feminists’ work and it’s a theme that does get picked up in some feminist 
science studies. But I think it really is articulated most powerfully by Butler in Gender 
Trouble; and I think that book marked a real turning point. Once that book was 
published and had the impact that it did people really started to think quite 
differently about sex and gender. The book in some ways describes something that 
had already happened - it is in some ways a book review, you know? Of other 
books? But it described it so articulately and so powerfully that it made something 
appear before your eyes even though you knew it was already there. That’s kind of 
the magical thing I think about really powerful conceptual writing, really powerful 
scholarly writing. And Marilyn’s writing has a lot of that in it too. It’s incredible to 
think what would have happened if Before and After Gender had been published in 
1974.  
So… yeah, it depends a little bit what you mean by queer, obviously. I think at that 
time in the 1990’s a lot of people were still using the feminist language of women 
and using the feminist language of sexual difference and using terms that belong to 
a really important history of work in psychoanalysis and a lot of really important 
feminist activist work. And of course all that legacy of the seventies. People like 
Shulamith Firestone. So that was still around and that was still influential, but you 
could feel, definitely, I felt, definitely that there was a shift going on away from 
those categories. And Donna Haraway would be one of the other key people who 
began to articulate a very, very different political script for feminism. And like a lot 
of people, when I first read the 1978 articles that Haraway wrote, I did not really 
appreciate the scale of her intervention,  and even when I reviewed her first book in 
1988, Primate Visions, I was still struggling. The first time I her 1985 article ‘A 
Manifesto for Cyborgs’, yeah I was definitely kind of like, what?  
 I had to read that over several years to really appreciate its implications.  I still re-
read that article. It has so much in it.  
Silvia:  Do you think a similar reaction is reached when one first reads The Gender of the 
Gift?   
Sarah:  I think it really depends on your training. Because I was formally trained in feminist 
anthropology and the question of the exchange of women was just so prominent. I 
mean Gayle Rubin is the one who shows how important that question is in her 1975 
essay on ‘TheTraffic in  Women’. It was a standard reading for any undergraduate 
doing anything remotely related to feminist anthropology in the 1970s and the 
1980s. And it’s so clearly written. It’s so vividly clear. And in that article she wants to 
know about what she calls the ‘exact mechanisms’ of how sex, sexuality, and the 
‘sex/gender system’ are reproduced and that’s her question really. And one of my 
favourite pieces that Marilyn wrote is her review of Melanesian marriage exchange, 
in which you can really hear this kind of puzzle of how to deal with Levi Strauss and 
how to deal with the exchange of women constantly driving her analysis; she 
produces a really elegant way to move beyond trying to explain the traffic in women 
by giving it a somewhat positive aspect. , which is  what Annette Weiner tried to do 
by showing that women have their own exchange systems. You know, women have 
their own value system and that makes sense up to a point. But Marilyn took a much 
more radical approach to that. When I read The Gender of the Gift I was so excited 
about the chapter where she talks about reproduction and how you have to make 
men and women first before you can make a baby. Because what she was doing was 
situating the whole question of exchange in relation to a very different 
understanding of gender; she took the ‘sex/gender system’ apart, she claimed that 
gender didn’t adhere to the person in any sort of neat one to one fashion but that it 
was more like a kinetic identity that you could use partially and also ‘backwards’ – in 
which the effect becomes the cause. It’s a great counterintuitive model on one  
level, but if you take it from the point of view of reading Monique Wittig or from the 
point of view of being a lesbian or queer, actually it makes perfect sense! (Laughs).  
 And I think that’s probably one of the things about queer  -- that queer is partly 
about what is there, but partly queer is about how you are reading. Because if you 
are reading with a sensitivity to being very intensively othered within your own 
society – ontologically, grammatically, constantly -- then of course you’re going to 
read very differently than if you are  reading from the point of view of beingpart of 
the status quo. .  
Paul:  There’s another convergence again around the shifting contexts in which gender 
becomes the shifting context of knowledge production, where the same device 
[gender] becomes something else, as very much put forward again in Strathern’s 
work.  
Sarah:  Context is very important to Marilyn Strathern’s work. But it’s quite a sophisticated 
reading because she also wants to get out of the binary habit of thinking about 
context as external to whatever it is that’s being contextualised and she actually 
wants – I think it’s one of the things she does really skilfully- she wants us to think 
about context as something that’s much more part of what is seemingly shaped by 
it. She wants us to be able to think of that relation in a less binary way.  
Paul:  In a post-plural kind of a way?  
Sarah:  Yes, in a post-plural, which is also backwards, way. I think what she means by post-
plural (and that’s one of the terms she talks a lot about in After Nature) is the way 
context is used in what you might call the western imagination, in that you can 
always talk about the individual in relation to society or the individual in relation to 
biology or biology in relation to society – that contextualising move pluralises 
everything for the Euro-American.  So in After Nature she’s concerned about what 
happens when you pluralise everything, you know, what’s your ground.  After 
Nature is all about what happens when the formative means of distinction are 
themselves unhooked as it were.  
EJ: So how has that way of thinking influenced your work and that way that you’ve engaged 
with multiple kinds of knowledge? 
Sarah:  Well, because I work a lot in biology labs, I think one of the really surprising things 
for me was, you know, how queer they are. Because the thing is, the way biology is 
used as a kind of ‘dominant logic’, you might say, is all about fixing things, you know 
and it’s about how things are determined. And if you’re coming from a feminist 
background the way that biology is used is really political because its constantly 
being used to justify patterns of behaviour using a totally circular logic like, “well 
that’s because it’s biological and there’s nothing you can do about it”, and also the 
biological comes to mean the universal and innate… Also it’s used in a punitive way 
like, “how could you question that?” you know, “how could you possibly question 
that?”. Even Shulamith Firestone (1972) in the first part of The Dialectic of Sex says, 
‘they’ll think you’re mad if you question things like that’. So, when you go into a 
biology lab and you start talking to scientists about something basic like how 
fertilization occurs, I mean it’s just so different from the mainstream narrative, the 
kind of normative narrative that Emily Martin talks about (1991) that very powerful, 
very deterministic,  overarching and oddly ubiquitous gendered narrative about 
male agency and female passivity, which then quickly becomes a narrative  about 
violent male aggression being necessary for the survival of the species and all those 
things that Donna Haraway writes so beautifully about in her work.. But when you 
go into the lab it’s just so totally different. Fertilization itself turns out to be still a bit 
of a riddle, and a bit of a fiddle. You’ve got cases where it happens and others where 
it doesn’t and nobody really knows why.  And so what the actual, professional 
scientific world of a lot of bench biology is all about, if you’re going to use Marilyn’s 
description, is ‘things not reproducing themselves exactly’. One theory about why 
certain biological functions are so highly conserved is precisely because they don’t 
always work the same way. And this is a very different world from the world where 
half your genes come from your Mum and half from your Dad and that makes you a 
unique individual, you know. I mean that is so not what is happening in an actual 
biology lab where you’ll be sitting with an embryologist and she’ll be like, “so, 
sometimes when I’m training pot docs I want to show them  how resilient and tough 
these little embryos are”. So she’ll rip them apart, she’s in her micromanipulator and 
she rips apart an embryo and says “I could take half this embryo and half that 
embryo and stuff it all back in, and it’s just like putting it all in a big shopping bag, 
and it’ll be fine. It’ll grow, it’ll develop, it’ll be fine”. They’re so robust human 
embryos it’s remarkable what you can do to them. Mammalian embryos in general. I 
mean they do actually have a shell, it’s actually quite hard the outside of the 
embryo, which is why it has to be cut in order to do a biopsy or to do micro-
injection. And when you dump out what’s inside of this shell it just sits there like an 
empty container, and you can fill it back up again and make a new whole, and that’s 
just a very, very different take on the biological ‘rule book’ than the one where 
everything is predetermined and there are strict laws that apply like  “DNA makes  
RNA  makes protein”. Now, after Dolly, we know that even that’s not true. I mean 
Dolly was a very fascinating project because it was one of those projects that was 
thought to be impossible, like human IVF was thought to be impossible by many 
people, and it turns out that biology can do all these things that nobody expected it 
to -- and that just goes to prove Butler’s point that it’s your perception that’s 
actually the determining thing not the perceived. It’s the perception that’s driving 
the production of a specific world – including its ‘fixed’ possibilities. It’s not like that 
world is just there and that’s why you perceive it that way.  
Paul: You spoke of some of your conversations with biologists here and their struggle to 
understand what you were doing; their struggle to perceive their own perceptions 
after your view.  
Sarah:  Well, I think biologists are highly varied. Some of them are very interested in the 
social, ethical, philosophical domains of their work, and some of them are quite 
interested in critical perspectives on their work.  Some scientists really don’t like 
that, they find it bothersome and pointless. So when you’re an anthropologist and 
you’re working with biologists in labs you’re mainly working with the biologists who 
want you there and think that it’s interesting.  
It’s kind of weird how many biologists from Cambridge I’d worked with before I 
came to Cambridge. I’d never really made that connection until after I came to 
Cambridge but I think part of it is that when they’re trained here they do get this 
college experience  with lots of other disciplines, and it’s considered to be quite 
important that you can sit down at lunch or dinner and have a conversation with 
someone in a completely different field from you. That’s actually considered to be a 
highly valued skill.  
I So as an ethnographer, I mostly ended up working in biology labs with a head of lab 
being someone who was signalling to the other people in the lab that I was a 
respected guest and then of course the team were willing to take their time and 
show you things. I remember I did a study of preimplantation of genetic diagnosis at 
Guy’s Hospital in London in 2001 or 2002, and I was very, very nervous of going to 
give my presentation there about the outcome of my field research. I felt that I had 
got a very good sense of what they do in the lab. I had learned a lot, I had shed a lot 
of my preconceptions about what pre-implantation of genetic diagnosis is about, but 
I hadn’t really had time to analyse the data or tell them anything significant other 
than what I had learned from them about how they do what they do. Which all 
seemed rather obvious and underwhelming. So I went to see Marilyn, which I 
usually do when I’m really having a lot of difficulty with something. I said I don’t 
know what I’m going to tell them. I’ve spent a year in their lab observing their 
practice and I don’t know what to say other than that this is what they’re doing.  
And she said well just say that. That’s exactly what you should tell them. That you 
have learnt what they’re doing. So I did. I went and I told them my perception of 
what it was they were doing and they were totally impressed. It really helped to 
build trust and they were like “oh yeah, you understand what we’re doing don’t 
you?”. And they were so surprised and reassured. Once that connection happens 
then you can go to a very different set of questions. It takes a long time to build up 
those kind of relationships and it has really instilled in me a deep respect for the 
power of description. I mean people might think it’s pretty straightforward to 
describe a scientific experiment but I think it’s very, very difficult to describe one in a 
way that the scientists themselves would agree it’s a good description. That’s 
actually quite difficult to do. But I have learned that it’s one of the most important 
things to be able to do if you want to be respected as someone who does 
ethnography in labs. 
It’s kind of interesting on the reproduction question because what it means is that if 
you can give them back a version of something that they’ve given you, it creates a 
bond -- as opposed to if you can’t give back a version of something that they’ve 
given you. Then it does the reverse it creates more of a mistrust.  
EJ: But in a sense that’s what good anthropology should do, right? Give back that sort of 
image of the social world? 
Sarah:  Yeah. I mean those are the kinds of questions that I would ideally like to bring into 
the lab a bit more. Because I think that what’s happening to biology right now is 
quite dramatic. I mean there are really dramatic changes happening in biology right 
now, and of course I’m at Cambridge so I see this all the time. Some of the very 
foundational understandings of how biological processes work are being 
abandoned. Because they are being replaced by new means of doing things that 
supersede those older orders. For example the ability to make an induced, 
pluripotent stem cell with only two or three additional elements. You know, to take 
a skin cell and to add two or three additional factors and turn it into a gamete And 
then to use  one of those for an egg and make a new animal. I mean that is way 
beyond where it was thought biology could go even just ten years ago. And that’s a 
technological accomplishment, a superb technological accomplishment that is the 
outcome of decades of craft work in the lab; profoundly artisanal work with the 
components of the lab, including all of the living things that are in the lab. And that 
level of technological control is quite astounding. But what’s happened at the 
moment is that scientists aren’t really sure what to do with these new abilities. OK 
you can make an induced pluripotent stem cell and yes, you can do loads of 
different things with it and yes, it sort of up-ends the apple cart of biological 
assumptions, but then what? And you’ve got that revolutionary overturning of 
previous ideas at the same time that you have this very intense concentration on 
what’s called translation which is turning a scientific technique or product into a 
highly applicable device or procedure.  
So then you start to get more interdisciplinary kinds of scientific approaches to specific 
problems, and at places like Stanford they won’t fund any new scientific buildings 
unless it’s for some kind of interdisciplinary project that’s essentially topical. And it’s 
so clear that now is the point when the social sciences should really be making a 
greater contribution than ever to the understanding of bio-scientific translation. I 
mean I can’t really think of a time when it was more obvious… Scientists need to be 
able to understand exactly the sort of question like how are their perceptions are 
affecting what they’re doing, what are the knowledge systems that they’re using, 
and what are the assumptions that are built into those, what is their black box and 
how do they open it? All those questions from science studies. This is really the 
moment when those kinds of questions should be asked, but it’s still very, very hard 
to make those links. We’ll see.  
Silvia:  And can you speak perhaps about, or towards the question of the conceptual 
element that is built into our re-descriptions? So that when we do ethnography in 
the lab or in another setting, that the description that emerges from that, and that 
might be understood by those who are actually doing the technical work, might also 
entail the development of conceptual elements which shift and open up that which 
we have observed.  
Sarah: Yeah. That’s a really good question. Yeah, the elementary forms of conceptual life - 
that’s what we should be writing at this very moment. Traditionally within the social 
sciences there is something called social theory that has been used as the source of 
overarching analytical approaches to things like economy, society, culture, and I feel 
at the moment that’s one of the things that’s really shifting because we’re kind of in 
the same situation as the scientists in that there are a lot of things happening to our 
worlds for which we don’t really have adequate conceptual resources. Or maybe I 
should say, theoretical resources, because I’ve started to distinguish between what 
you might call the level of the theoretical and the level of the conceptual. When 
you’re doing ethnographic work what you’re trying to do is to get people to give you 
their descriptions of the things that are happening in their world, you’re trying to get 
them to explain to you how they know what they know, you’re getting them to 
introduce you to their key concepts. And their key theories. Because any 
embryologist who’s talking about how to handle an embryo in a dish has a theory 
about how that embryo is developing and what it does, and what you can do to it or 
what you can’t do to it or what will happen. I remember I did an interview with 
Austin Smith, it must’ve been nearly twenty years ago, and I asked him, well, how do 
you characterise a cell line? And he gave me a really clear and detailed explanation 
about how it takes a really long time because you have to keep comparing and 
comparing and comparing to see if this cell line that you think is A is always A, or 
whether sometimes it’s B. In which case you have two different lines. And so you 
can learn from scientists what are their key conceptual points of reference, their 
landmarks, and how those ideas are  embedded in their practice. Characterisation is 
a theory it’s a concept, it’s a practice, it’s all of those things. Characterisation, like 
translation is absolutely fundamental to the sciences today. You cannot standardise 
something unless you know what it is. You cannot know what it is until you’ve 
characterised it. So this is really really key. But there isn’t really like a social theory 
you could use to explain that repetitive, artisanal work of getting to know your cell 
culture – so you know when it’s happy, when it’s unhappy, when it wants to be left 
alone, when it needs your attention PDQ or else. I mean you could use Bruno Latour 
for whom the concept of translation is very important. He has the concept of 
translation, he has the concept of purification, and we could take these and we 
could apply them as it were to the lab, but it’s a little bit like getting dressed for the 
party after you’ve gone home. There’s not really much point.  What you need when 
you’re in the lab is to be able to extract some of the conceptual resources that are 
operative there and then use them to produce a sociological model of what’s going 
on. I mean that’s what I do, and that’s what I teach my students to do.  
Paul:  That comes back to what you were saying about your new respect or valuing of good 
description and the ideas emerging from that.  
Sarah:  That’s right. Yeah I have this concept I’ve developed of interliteracy. Interliteracy is 
when you can describe the scholarly literature of a particular discipline well enough 
that someone in that discipline will recognise your description of it as equivalent to 
that of a competent insider. Like, I can tell you what the main point of this scientific 
article is, and you’ll agree that that’s the main point or more or less. And I can tell 
you in the methods section what are the slightly dodgy bits. And I think a situation 
where a scientist could read Marilyn Strathern and the ethnographer in that lab 
could read their latest article in Cell, and they were working together, I think that’s 
the interesting direction we could be headed in – a much greater ability to generate 
genuine high-level conceptual exchange.  
EJ:  So in a sense, what you’re saying, is it what you’re saying that’s really conceptual 
and theoretical is a false dichotomy, because at the end of the day what you’re 
doing with your ethnographies is to produce a kind of response to that… 
Sarah:  That’s right. I’m maybe not making quite so broad a statement as that but I’m saying 
that I have begun to distinguish between the theoretical and the conceptual 
because I have found that working at the level of the conceptual, working with what 
you might call ‘conceptual elements’, is a very important part of sharing knowledge. 
It’s a very important part of enabling us to work in areas where there isn’t really any 
sort of available theoretical edifice and also because, like I was saying, we are a little 
bit where the scientists are, we’re living in a period of extremely rapid and 
substantial technological change. I mean if you think about it every single aspect of 
our identities from how we communicate to how we make decisions to how we 
write how we get news has all been hugely affected by new technologies. It’s almost 
like our generation is in a blur of technological reinvention and I think that makes it 
hard for us to acknowledge things that are very obvious and right in front of us but 
hard to name. I have a word for it. I call it technological bewilderment. I sometimes 
wonder if Brexit was partly fuelled by a sense of being left out, being left behind that 
was partly to do with technology, but that’s another matter… I think as a result we 
don’t have what you might call the theoretical tools that might be fit for purpose. I 
heard a lecture a very prominent Cambridge scientist recently, Azim Surani,  who is 
probably one of the most famous scientists in his field of developmental biology, 
and he was basically saying it was very important to work with the animal models 
(mice) he was using through his entire career but he could now see why they were 
quite misleading. Which is a pretty major statement by a very senior scientist that 
he can now see how most of his work was based on a very dated, and in some ways 
quite inappropriate model system. And that he’s not working with that any more 
and he’s going to be working with new model systems. That’s a real question for us I 
think, what is the model system that we’ll be using to analyse whatever it is we’re 
looking at, you know? Let’s say you want to write about why BREXIT happened, you 
know, what is the theoretical model you’re going to use? I mean I don’t really think 
you can use Gramsci.  You can use Stuart Hall up to a point but I feel like I’ve backed 
off from using theory the way I used to and even the way I was trained to, because it 
just feels that it’s not actually engaging with the things that need to be explained. I 
mean I’m working on fertility transitions right now and I think most people think 
they know what fertility is, and one of the main arguments about fertility over time, 
is the demographic argument that as people begin to perceive that their children 
will live longer and that there are benefits to having fewer children they begin to 
exercise more control over their family size, which gets smaller. Demographic 
transition was one of the main features of modernity – when people started to have 
much smaller families, to invest more in the children and that’s where a lot of the 
changes associated with the modern era supposedly came from. It’s a very 
contested theory but the basic idea is that people’s perceptions of fertility affect 
their reproductive behaviour. And at the moment what we are seeing are some 
pretty significant changes in how fertility is perceived both in terms of who is 
thinking about fertility because now a lot of queer and trans people are thinking 
from a much earlier age about possibly having a family, or even assuming that they 
would, which even twenty years ago would have been a very different picture.  
Meanwhile in the heterosexual population egg freezing is being marketed to mostly 
young presumed to be fertile women, and fertility is coming to be seen as much 
more precarious.  So from a situation where it was precarious not to use 
contraception, it’s now become precarious not to have children before you’re thirty-
five. So I don’t think we have a sociological theory of fertility that can explain that. 
It’s not available. It doesn’t exist. But for really basic questions about ‘what does 
reproduction mean to people’ and ‘how are reproductive politics central to the 
functioning of the state’, you have to know more about those questions. So you 
have to be generating those new conceptual resources. And something like fertility 
anxiety is a concept, it’s a new conceptual approach to fertility, but it’s not like it’s 
being introduced from some overarching body of theory: it’s being produced from 
aggregate observations about a very curious sociological phenomenon that is very 
much in our midst.  
Silvia:  Given the distinction you propose between the conceptual and the theoretical, how 
do you read the repositioning of Strathern within anthropological theory? 
Sarah:  You’re better placed to answer that question because I’m now the chair of a 
sociology department. I think gender and kinship are seen has been a huge part of 
how anthropology has changed over the past 20 years because it was kinship that 
turned out to be other area that came to be associated with rapid technological 
transition. You might of thought it was mainly sex and gender but it was actually 
when gender and kinship got put together -- in particular by Yanagisako and Collier, 
but also by Marilyn -- that we began to see a much bigger uptake within 
anthropology of a whole new approach to what I call relationality as technicality. I 
remember Marilyn and I talking, it was a while back, about 20 years ago, when  it 
started to be obvious that the anthropology of new reproductive technologies was 
being very widely taught. It’s in a lot of course curricula, and even in textbooks, and 
we had a bit of a laugh because obviously when we started out doing it, nobody was 
doing it and we did not at all expect it would become mainstream within the 
discipline so quickly. I think in general what happens is that when there are major 
contributions from feminist scholars they do tend to be kind of side-lined, 
unfortunately. I mean I think that 1970s feminist literature and the 1980s feminist 
anthropology literature is fantastic. It’s so interesting to read, it’s all about economy, 
property, identity… It’s very political it’s all about materiality, kinship exchange, 
gender identity and power, it’s about hierarchy, it’s about the state, it’s about 
sexuality, it’s about everything. But that literature has just kind of vanished. Hardly 
anybody reads it or uses it or refers to it or cites it anymore however. I don’t think 
anybody teaches ‘The Traffic in Women’ (Rubin 1975)  any more, I don’t know. So 
then what happens is there’ll be these new high profile areas –and I won’t name any 
in particular –that become associated with the emerging or important theoretical 
questions, which are mostly theories by men, and then there’s sort of an effort to fit 
some of the powerful women in the discipline – like Strathern or Haraway -- into 
thaose ‘-isms’. But they don’t really fit fit, because it isn’t really what they’re doing. 
So it doesn’t really work very well and you get these really stupid debates about “is 
she part of that –ism or or isn’t she?” It’s like when you give a paper and you finish 
and someone says “so are you basically making a sort of Foucauldian argument?” 
They have to name it with this other –ism category that isn’t anything to do with 
what you’re doing, and even if you haven’t even mentioned Foucault. And then you 
have to say “well, no not really, I mean Foucault’s very interesting but actually I 
wasn’t doing a Foucauldian analysis” I just think that is so tiresome and unhelpful.  
 It is rare even for hugely influential and original women scholars to just be seen on 
their own terms – to be there own ism! I think that Marilyn is now, and so is Donna 
Haraway, but it took a long time, much longer than it should have done. And I think 
your book will be really important in helping to make that clear. I really hope that 
people continue to come back to Marilyn’s work on its own terms and think about 
the questions we’re dealing with today. It’s a consistent pattern that very powerful 
feminist arguments have been side-lined and feminist literature has been side-lined, 
or re-aligned under some other male –ism that just detracts from their own work.  
EJ:  I just want to ask one of our last questions about how you conceive of this question 
of queer genealogy both in your work and your trajectory.  
Sarah:  Thank you for this question about queer conceptions and genealogies. I think that 
queer genealogies can be defined by what you might call a lack of loyalty. Because I 
think a lot of the way of academia’s genealogies work is through loyalty. And 
through a kind of implicit exchange: In exchange for your loyalty we will give you this 
and this. I think what a lot of feminist academics who’ve tried to challenge the 
system have done is to be loyal up to a point, but then to be disloyal. I think it’s also 
true of queer. Queer in the academy is about the forms of disloyalty that you wear 
publicly. That doesn’t just mean your physical self-presentation, how conformist you 
are to say, normative gender expectations, but also about what you say, what you 
spend your time doing, who you include in things, where you put your attention.  It’s 
about who and what you want to be loyal to in the sense of extending your trust and 
energy towards certain things and not others. Similarly it’s about what you don’t do 
and what you won’t participate in when you withdraw your attention and energy. I 
think creating a queer space within the academy is very important and that doesn’t 
just mean queer people. In my research group even trying to eat different kinds of 
food, or breaking with conventions – so we don’t go to the college dinner but to a 
vegetarian buffet after the talk instead. I bring my dog to work, we have poems and 
songs and dances, and I have involved several artists with our group. Things like that 
are part of breaking down the reproductive mechanisms that keep certain kinds of 
expectations operating, and thereby opening up the space for a different set of 
expectations to thrive. So queering the academy is about being queer in the 
academy. It’s about institutional non-compliance and deviance, and creating 
different ways to be, to survive and to thrive in the academy. Audre Lorde has that 
great poem about being in doorways, and being inside and outside, and yeah you do 
have to develop queer group survival tactics, they’re very important. And it’s equally 
important for them to be shared, collectivised and maintained. Because if you don’t 
have that you can’t keep going and do the work that needs to be done.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
